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Abstract
Police often come into contact with suspects who are mentally ill and who may
resist arrest. Research has indicated that individuals with mental illness may have
greater difficulty understanding and responding to commands than those who are not
mentally ill. This two-group repeated-measures vignette study sought to determine
whether law enforcement officers use different degrees of force with suspects who
display overt signs of mental illness. One hundred and forty police officers were
randomly assigned in equal proportions to read either two vignettes involving a criminal
act in which the perpetrators displayed signs of mental illness (experimental condition) or
two vignettes in which the perpetrators displayed no signs of mental illness (control
condition). It was hypothesized that officers assigned to the experimental condition
would use more force than officers assigned to the control condition. It was further
hypothesized that officers in the experimental condition would experience a greater
degree of negative affect than those in the control condition. Results did not support
either hypothesis, suggesting that officers may not react differently to suspects with
mental illness. The hope is that this research will offer insights for police departments
with and without use-of-force training programs.
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LAW ENFORCEMENT DECISION MAKING WITH SUSPECTS WHO ARE
MENTALLY ILL: WHAT IS REASONABLE USE OF FORCE?
Chapter 1. Introduction and Literature Review
Statement of the Problem
In the United States, approximately 61.5 million adults experience some form of
mental illness; 13.6 million of those adults suffer from severe forms of mental illness. In
fact, 2.4 million adults are living with schizophrenia (National Alliance on Mental
Health, 2013). Research from the National Alliance on Mental Health revealed that only
a small percentage of individuals with mental illness are receiving treatment (NAMI,
2013). A law like the Community Mental Health Centers Act of 1963 reduced the
resources available for the mentally ill. Psychiatric hospitals lost funding, and the criteria
to involuntarily commit someone became even more stringent. The closing of state
psychiatric hospitals, better known as deinstitutionalization, left many people with severe
mental illness homeless and unmedicated. Nationally, more persons with mental illness
are in prisons and jails than in psychiatric hospitals (Hails & Borum, 2003).
The challenges and problems of criminal-justice functionaries interacting with the
mentally ill are often experienced by law enforcement, as first responders, on patrol.
LaGrange (2000) found that, on average, 89% of officers come into contact with
individuals who are mentally disordered. Of all police calls, 7% to 10% involve suspects
who are mentally ill (Hails & Borum, 2003). Unfortunately, officer training with
individuals who are mentally ill is minimal, with an average 6.5 hours of training devoted
to impaired individuals. The term impaired individual includes a wide range of
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“unpredictable” people, for example, suspects who abuse alcohol and other substances
and suspects experiencing psychiatric disorders that range from schizophrenia to
dementia (Kaminski, Digiovanni, & Downs, 2004).
Officers, on average, receive 40 hours of training, most of which is devoted to deescalation techniques in use of force situations. In a limited number of departments,
officers are self-selected to be in specialized mental-health units that offer additional
training. The facts that these units are only in a small number of departments is
problematic because research shows that individuals who are mentally ill do not respond
to normal police techniques in the same way as the general population does. Research
also shows that using general techniques causes an escalation in the use of force
(Morabito et al., 2012). Borum (2000) found that communication and mediation skills
were two of the highest predictors of de-escalation. Police standard training procedures
include the use of commands and demands. Suspects who are experiencing mental
disturbances may not fully appreciate traditional police commands in the same way as
they would respond to trained de-escalation techniques. The latter are often gauged to a
specific situation and individual. Many studies show that police encounters with
impaired persons are more likely to involve the use of force than are encounters with
unimpaired persons (Crawford & Burns, 1998; Engel, Sobol, & Worden, 2000; Friedrich,
1980).
Lack of knowledge of mental illness is often cited as a reason officers respond
with unreasonable force (Watson, Morabito, Draine, & Ottati, 2008). Therefore,
educating officers on mental illness has proven to be more effective than the status quo in
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reducing force in police interactions with the mentally ill (Watson et al., 2008). Research
indicates that the use of force should follow a use-of-force continuum, in which the
officer’s force is proportional with the suspect’s resistance (Dror, 2007). This
continuum is first used in police-academy training to guide novice first responders with a
conceptually clear way of thinking about the level of force that is reasonably related to
the suspect’s resistance. Later, once on the police force, officers think of the kind of
force that would be reasonably deployed in relation to the resistance they face from
suspects—the very essence of the linear force continuum that was part of their academy
training.
The first level of the force continuum is law enforcement’s presence. The
presence of a police officer is expected to deter crime or de-escalate a potentially violent
or hostile situation. Once on the scene, without any indication of suspect resistance,
police officers are instructed to use nonthreatening verbal commands. Police may
increase the volume of their voice and issue short-worded commands (e.g., stop, do not
move). When verbal commands are insufficient, empty-hand controls may be indicated.
These controls include soft techniques (e.g., grabbing or holding a suspect) or hard
techniques (e.g., punching or kicking a suspect). Next, nonlethal or less lethal methods
are available (e.g., blunt impact, chemical sprays, and conduct energy devices). Finally,
police are authorized to use lethal or deadly force when the suspect poses an imminent
threat of serious bodily injury to the officer or someone else (Atherley & Hickman,
2014).
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The escalation through different levels of resistance and responses to resistance is
generally conceived of as linear. Research on this continuum is quite limited, however,
and police-suspect interactions are very fluid and, at times, fast paced. Depending on the
factual circumstances, the movement from verbal commands to lethal force may occur in
seconds. More frequently, police are able to use their presence to diffuse potentially
violent interactions. For interactions with suspects, police generally assume a somewhat
linear progression—one that is also predictably responsive and rational (Burrows, 2007).
Purpose of the Study
Empirical research examining the relationship between police use of force and
mental illness is lacking (Johnson, 2011). With an increasing number of interactions
between police and suspects who are mentally ill and the tendency of such suspects to use
extreme resistance, research on the reasonableness of the use of force with suspects who
are mentally ill is critically important (Mulvey & White, 2014). This dissertation
explores the reasonableness of law enforcement departures from the force continuum
with suspects who are mentally ill. Specifically, the primary research question is: Do law
enforcement officers, when faced with a suspect who is mentally ill and acting
irrationally, alter their prescribed progression up the force continuum in ways that
account for or accommodate the suspect’s perceived unpredictability?
A secondary research question is as follows: Do law enforcement officers
experience a higher degree of negative affect when interacting with suspects who are
mentally ill versus suspects who are not mentally ill? Last, this dissertation examines
other factors that may be related to the independent or dependent variables. The hope is
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that this research will offer insights to police departments with and without use-of-force
training programs. Equally important, this kind of research raises awareness of the
challenges of responding to an ever-increasing number of persons who are mentally ill in
the criminal-justice system.
Literature Review
Law enforcement and use of force.
Law enforcement officers have many duties, one of which is being the first to
respond to scenes of crimes or suspected crimes. The challenge of being a “first
responder” includes encounters involving citizens and suspects who are mentally ill
(Teller, Munetz, Gil, & Ritter, 2014). These encounters may be difficult and dangerous
for law enforcement, as police-civilian and police-suspect interactions often engender
risks. Suspects who are mentally ill pose additional risks because they may behave
irrationally, thereby making a determination of the amount of force that is required more
difficult for officers. In such situations, police may respond with reasonable force in
reacting to perceived resistance, or they may respond by under- or overreacting (Police
Executive Research Forum [PERF], 2012). Police use-of-force decisions may be a
function of their awareness of mental illness, present mood, sense of empathy, or possibly
legal and psychological training as to how to engage individuals who are mentally
disturbed. All may be causal or mediating variables that account for variance in use-offorce decision making by police (Borum, 2000).
To the lay public, individuals who experience and display signs of severe mental
illness are often assumed to be dangerous, violent, unpredictable, untrustworthy, and
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untruthful (Watson, Corrigan, & Ottati, 2004). Such assumptions about the expression of
mental illness certainly vary in accuracy. These assumptions, however, not only are
shared by law enforcement but, at times, also frame their interactions with suspects and
victims who are mentally ill. The stigma associated with mental illness may at times
cause police to make false attributions about a suspect’s apparent resistance. In this way,
mental illness may confound officers’ decisions about their choice of responses.
Unfortunately, researchers have yet to examine how these attributions about individuals
with mental illness influence officers’ reactions (Watson et al., 2004). This dissertation
takes small steps to explore how law enforcement officers perceive suspects who are
mentally ill and how their perceptions affect use-of-force decisions.
Some notable research exists on the role of race and class on police officers’
decision making (Adler, Mueller, & Laufer, 2016). Notable cases in the media over the
past decade highlight lay perceptions that police stop-and-frisk policies and use-of-force
practices are, in fact, race based. Research offers some support for these perceptions
(Plant & Peruche, 2005). Literature is emerging on the nature and characteristics of
police officer responses to suspects who are mentally ill. Watson et al. (2004), for
example, described a paradigmatic response to exaggerated levels of suspect demands
and reasonable compliance techniques. The authors concluded the following:
Fear of personal injury and a lack of understanding and empathy on the part of the
police officers, combined with the difficulty or reluctance to comply with
instructions on the part of the person with mental illness, are the leading causes of
violent confrontations between the two. (Watson et al., 2004, p. 379)
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A confluence of situational and perceptual factors, according to Watson et al.
(2004), raises the risk of increasing levels of force. A priori knowledge that a suspect has
mental illness may frame an officer’s response when first on the scene of a crime.
Watson et al. (2004) conducted a vignette study with a sample of police officers. Each
vignette provided a scene in which the suspects exhibited varying degrees of mental
illness. A control group responded to suspects with no mental illness. When subjects
responded to a vignette with a suspect with schizophrenia, for example, they were
concerned with control along with feeling empathy, both of which were confounded by
an increased perception of dangerousness. Other research has demonstrated that officers
do, indeed, perceive individuals with mental illness as dangerous and that the level of
perceived dangerousness is associated with officer characteristics. For example, Bolton
(2000) found that younger undertrained white officers viewed mental illness in suspects
as more dangerous in contrast to older minority officers with training in mental illness.
Kaminski et al. (2004) found that police interactions with impaired suspects,
including those with mental illness, are more likely to involve the use of force as
compared to interactions with non-impaired suspects. This likelihood is the result, in
part, of the belief that suspects who are mentally ill fail to decrease their levels of
resistance when presented with traditional police use-of-force techniques and commands.
One of many explanations offered for different use-of-force decisions with persons who
are mentally ill includes “negative” attitudes, more generally, toward persons with mental
illness. Lack of education and exposure to persons with mental illness are often
discussed in relation to use-of-force decisions (Borum, 2000).
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The complexity of police officers’ perceptions was considered by Morabito et al.
(2012). These researchers concluded that “although people with mental illness are
usually not dangerous, they can behave bizarrely and may not respond to police officer
cues in a predictable manner based on the behavior of others” (Morabito et al., 2012, p.
58). If this bizarre behavior comes from a highly irrational state of mind, the potential for
harm to all parties increases (Kaminski et al., 2004). The unpredictability of the situation
causes officers to be apprehensive and more likely to respond with force. Police officers
often mistake the unpredictable behavior as hostile and purposeful resistance (Cordner,
2006) when, in fact, it is literally a lack of ability to comprehend and respond to the
officer’s requests.
Johnson (2011) explored whether suspects with mental disorders were more likely
than non-disordered suspects to prompt physical force from the police. The findings
revealed that suspects who were mentally disordered were significantly more likely than
other suspects to act violently, resist the police, and possess a weapon. Once these
characteristics were controlled for, however, suspects who were mentally disordered were
not any more likely than suspects who were not mentally disordered to receive physical
force.
As Watson et al. (2004) recognized, multiple points of contact are possible
between police and persons with mental illnesses. In their vignette study of police
reactions to a suspect with schizophrenia, they explored the differential police response
to (a) a person in need of assistance, (b) a victim, (c) a witness, and (d) a suspect. This
chapter reviews police-suspect interactions, while recognizing the importance of such
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interactions. Special attention is given to the laws, guidelines, and standards governing
police use of force and how some police departments have developed specialized units
and programs to ensure a measured response to suspects who are mentally ill. This
review is followed by a consideration of the role of stigma in fashioning police responses
to suspects who are mentally ill. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the
prominent psychological theories that explain some of the variance in how and why
police attribute dangerousness to the mentally ill population.
Legal constraints on law enforcement.
At about 10:45 p.m. on October 3, 1974, Memphis Police Officers Elton
Hymon and Leslie Wright were dispatched to answer a “prowler inside call.”
Upon arriving at the scene they saw a woman standing on her porch and
gesturing toward the adjacent house. She told them she had heard glass
breaking and that “they” or “someone” was breaking in next door. While
Wright radioed the dispatcher to say that they were on the scene, Hymon
went behind the house. He heard a door slam and saw someone run across
the backyard. The fleeing suspect, who was appellee-respondent’s decedent,
Edward Garner, stopped at a 6-feet-high chain link fence at the edge of the
yard. With the aid of a flashlight, Hymon was able to see Garner’s face and
hands. He saw no sign of a weapon, and, though not certain, was “reasonably
sure” and “figured” that Garner was unarmed. He thought Garner was 17 or
18 years old and about 5’5” or 5’7” tall. While Garner was crouched at the
base of the fence, Hymon called out “police, halt” and took a few steps
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toward him. Garner then began to climb over the fence. Convinced that if
Garner made it over the fence he would elude capture, Hymon shot him. The
bullet hit Garner in the back of the head. Garner was taken by ambulance to
a hospital, where he died on the operating table. Ten dollars and a purse
taken from the house were found on his body (Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S.
1,4, 1985).
In the police academy, all cadets hear about the life and death of Edward Garner,
a young, unarmed, fleeing suspect. The United States Supreme Court case that bears his
name, Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), remains the law today and has been
interpreted literally thousands of times by federal and state courts. The law may be
simply stated: It is unconstitutional, a violation of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition
on unreasonable seizures, for police to use deadly force against a fleeing felony suspect
who is unarmed. Of course, when police have probable cause to believe that there is a
threat of serious physical harm to officers or others, the use of deadly force is justified
(e.g., when the suspect threatens police or a civilian with a weapon). This outer boundary
on the permissible use of force by police is deeply embedded in all police-training
programs, in all state laws, and in all police department policies regarding the
“reasonable use of force” (Tennenbaum, 1994).
The case of Tennessee v. Garner (1985) offers no more than the constitutional
boundary for what police may or may not do. The prevailing standard for whether
excessive force can be used comes from a case that was decided 4 years later (Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 1989). In Graham v. Connor (1989), the Court explained that
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there must be a balancing of “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s
Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake”
(490 U.S., at 396). Thus, the Court ruled that determining, after the fact, whether
reasonable force was used by police comes from an objective reasonableness standard:
whether police officers behaved in an objectively reasonable way in light of the
surrounding facts and circumstances.
In the aftermath of Garner and Graham, countless cases alleging excessive force
were brought against police departments, municipalities, states, and the federal
government. Each case brings a challenge to the balancing test articulated in Graham v.
Connor (1989) or with an allegation of an unreasonable use of deadly force, a challenge
to Tennessee v. Garner (1985). In recent years, an increasing number of cases have
raised questions about the constitutionality of force used against suspects who are
mentally ill. Consider, for example, the case of Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d
1036 (6th Cir. 1992), in which a recently discharged patient with mental illness was shot
by a Taser four times and shot with bullets 22 times by police. National news
organizations fail to cover cases like James Boyd, who was shot by the Albuquerque
Police Department in 2014 after irrationally pleading with officers that he not receive
another directive from the Department of Defense. Each year, an increasing number of
cases of the killing of suspects with mental illness seem to become news stories that
never make it out of local news stations to national networks (e.g., CBS, NBC, and ABC)
or cable news programs.
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The challenge of determining the objective reasonableness of police officers’ use
of force with rational suspects is daunting. Making those determinations with the
additional complexity of a suspect population with mental illness is extraordinarily
difficult. One report on the problem of offenders with mental illness concluded the
following:
Persons with mental illness, drug and alcohol addictions, or disorders such as
autism can present police officers with difficult challenges. In some cases, a
person may brandish a weapon or otherwise appear to pose a threat to the public,
to the police, or to himself or herself. The threat may be a real one, or the
situation may be less dangerous than it appears, and often it is difficult to assess
the level of danger. These situations often are complicated when, because of their
conditions, persons cannot communicate effectively with police officers. In some
cases, they may appear to be threatening or uncooperative, when in fact they are
unable to understand an officer’s questions or orders. (PERF, 2012)
Police departments have more than milestone cases in constitutional law, state
laws, and departmental directives to help in their determinations. A long-standing metric
for determining the objective reasonableness of use-of-force decisions by police is
captured by a theoretical continuum—the use-of-force continuum (Terrill & Paoline,
2012).
The use-of-force continuum.
The use-of-force continuum guides the response of officers to escalating policesuspect encounters (Garner, Schade, Hepburn, & Buchanan, 1995). The International
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Association of Chiefs of Police defines force as the “amount of effort required by police
to compel compliance by an unwilling subject” (National Institute of Justice [NIJ], 2009,
p. 1). The use-of-force continuum is a practical guide designed to help officers determine
the optimal level of force to use in relation to the suspect’s resistance (Aveni, 2003;
Wolf, Mesloh, Henych, & Thompson, 2009). The continuum was derived when police
use of force clearly could not logically be conceptualized in dichotomous terms (i.e.,
either force or no force; Garner et al., 1995). Police have a singular objective: to gain
control of the situation. The concept of a use-of-force continuum moves officers through
a distinct and increasing series of steps, akin to ascending or descending a ladder, ranging
from the least amount of force, such as verbal commands, to deadly force (Aveni, 2003;
Terrill, 2005).
The use-of-force continuum begins when an officer arrives on scene. The
presence of the officer is supposed to impose order and, at the same time, halt and deter
any disruptive or criminal behavior. The presence of the responding officer imparts a
combination of legitimacy and power, while being both controlling and commanding
(NIJ, 2009). The second level of force entails a series of available verbal commands.
This stage of the use-of-force continuum comprises its own range of officer responses.
The first is a calm command. If the suspect does not listen, then the officer increases the
volume of the command and uses terse language for compliance (Clede & Parsons,
1987). The third and fourth stages of the use-of-force continuum are often thought of as
the intermediate level of force. In the third stage, an officer may use his or her body to
reclaim control of the situation by engaging in empty-hand control, consisting of soft and
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hard techniques (NIJ, 2009). Soft techniques are when an officer uses hands to grab,
hold, or restrain a suspect. Hard techniques are when officers need to use more
substantial physical force to match the suspect’s resistance. This resistance may entail
either striking or kicking the suspect. The fourth stage is when an officer uses a weapon
other than a gun to regain control. These weapons include batons, Tasers, and chemical
sprays (Aveni, 2003; Lumb & Friday, 1997). The goal of this stage is to immobilize the
suspect. The fifth and final stage entails lethal force, as when officers discharge their
guns. Lethal force may take place at any stage of the use-of-force continuum, except in
the first two stages (Garner et al., 1995; NIJ, 2009). The use of a gun is considered the
most lethal, even though, quite remarkably, death occurs in only one-fifth of police
shootings (Clede & Parsons, 1987; see Appendix A).
Over the past 20 years, the use-of-force continuum has assumed different forms.
Aveni (2003) carefully distinguished these forms, ranging from linear designs, modified
linear continuums, and nonlinear designs to perceptual continuums. These changes,
according to Aveni, are an attempt to represent the dynamic nature of police-suspect
interactions and to shift from a theoretical orientation to a more practical, real-life view.
The linear designs are much like the ladder analogy offered previously: Each rung is an
increasing sequence for escalation. The rungs are heuristics for officers when assessing
the level of resistance that they must apply (Terrill, 2005).
The modified linear continuums are akin to a tree that branches off into different
responses (see Appendix B). An example of a modified linear continuum is the 1997 FBI
suggested use-of-force model (Aveni, 2003). This model starts with the first rung, officer
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presence, and increases to verbal commands. The next step is where the model departs
from the traditional use-of-force continuum; instead of giving a command or a force
escalation, it gives the response of the suspect on two different branches, for example, if
he or she is compliant to the request by the officer or not (Borum, 2000). If the suspect is
compliant, the escalation ceases and a resolution is found; if the suspect is noncompliant,
the model continuum provides resistance-appropriate scenarios for the officer to engage
in relative to the suspect’s resistance (Aveni, 2003). This model was designed to allow
officers to see the use-of-force continuum as adaptive to each unique situation (see
Appendix C).
Nonlinear designs were created to represent the police officer’s everyday
encounters, which are anything but linear. Some law enforcement agencies, like Ontario,
Canada’s law enforcement agency, decided to use this model for multiple reasons. The
first reason is that this use-of-force continuum, which often takes the form of a wheel,
allows officers to immediately match the suspect’s resistance with a commensurate use of
force. Second, this model accounts for the wide variety of threats that the officer might
encounter that extends far past the traditional model. Last, and possibly the most
important, research shows that this technique reduces deadly force (Aveni, 2003) by
allowing officers to extricate themselves from a situation by disengagement or deescalation. Although all use-of-force continuums account for some form of deescalation, this model is the only one that incorporates it into the actual continuum. An
officer can quickly draw on these continuums in an encounter instead of having to recall
detailed department policies and protocols. As a result, an officer can quickly escalate or
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de-escalate force levels.
The last model, and one that is often used for training officers or investigating
use-of-force situations after the fact, is the perceptual continuum. The model starts with
officers’ expectations about the situation upon arrival and continues to the point when the
officers make their first point of contact with the suspect. The model then branches off
into three different factors: (a) possible threat perception, (b) key event, and (c) actual
threat perception. Each situation is analyzed and evaluated, and then a plan is formulated
to react. The reactions, similar to the theory of Cannon (1927) and expounded on by
Barlow (2002), include fight, flight, or freeze. The last branch is the aftermath of the
situation. This continuum allows for investigators and internal affairs to assess whether
the officer was justified in his or her response to the suspect.
The importance of these use-of-force continuum models is simple: to provide
officers with intuitive guidelines that structure what must, at times, be reflective reactions
to perceived and actual resistance. The reaction of some academics to these use-of-force
continuums is mixed. Garner et al. (1995), for example, reported that use-of-force
continuums are based on little, if any, empirical support and are not designed in ways that
allow for systematic measurement or operationalization. Instead, these use-of-force
continuums are modified and tailored to each police department’s needs and policies.
Some police use these use-of-force continuums to make internal policy and legal
requirements more formal.
For other departments, the use-of-force continuum functions as a heuristic for
police in situations during which response time is critical. Dror, Basola, and Busemeyer
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(1999) found that officers are more conservative in their use of force when in situations
that are considered low risk. The opposite occurs when officers are in high-risk
situations, during which police tend toward more risk taking. Dror et al. (1999)
concluded that these different behaviors are the result of a lack of cognitive capacity in
relation to the high-risk situation. They elaborate that officers are often using heuristics
in order to assess the scene, thus creating a need for a use-of-force continuum that
consists of small, succinct categories that allow for a measured construction of the force
necessary to respond to a suspect’s resistance. Garner et al. (1995) described the use-of force continuum as establishing “legal and policy requirements that officers use no more
force than is reasonably necessary to obtain compliance” (p. 151).
In this dissertation, the selection of a linear use-of-force continuum reflects (a) the
policy in place at the police department surveyed, (b) the most representative continuum
used by large municipal police departments, and (c) the best proxy for a rational and
justifiable escalation of police use of force in relation to suspect resistance.
These assumptions about compliance must not be violated if the use-of-force
continuum is going to allow for a linear increase or decrease in police use of force. These
assumptions also include two rational actors—police officers and suspects—who make
choices for increasing and decreasing force and resistance in ways that are reasonably
predictable (i.e., more force by police will prompt less resistance all the way up the useof-force continuum to deadly force). This two-dimensional use-of-force continuum does
not, however, accommodate irrational reactions, such as efforts to engage in deadly
resistance in response to minimal force, verbal commands, or mere presence at the scene.
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Suspects who are mentally ill, therefore, may introduce a confound to the inherent logic
of the continuum.
Mental illness and law enforcement.
Estimates vary widely as to the number of police-civilian interactions that involve
suspects who are mentally ill and the resulting number of arrests (Johnson, 2011;
Kaminski et al., 2004). A wide range of studies across many jurisdictions finds
significant contact between police and suspects who are mentally ill. For example,
LaGrange (2000) concluded that nearly 90% of all officers come into contact with
suspects who are mentally ill. Hails and Borum (2003) estimated that 10% of all police
calls involve suspects who are mentally ill. Further, Engel and Silver (2001) reported
that suspects who are mentally disordered were significantly more likely to be arrested
than those who are not mentally ill (47.5% vs. 27.9%, respectively).
Police departments often have explicit policies that explain how officers might
have to rethink the rationality of the use-of-force continuum in situations when a suspect
displays signs or symptoms of psychological and psychiatric distress. Policies tend to
cover three distinct sets of rules. First, officers must be able to recognize the kind of
behavior that is associated with a psychological or psychiatric diagnosis, particularly
those behaviors indicative of dangers to self and others. Officers are often asked to look
for recognizable signs and symptoms of mental illness, including but not limited to
exaggerated reactions based on apparent fear or anger, inappropriate and unprovoked
behaviors, frustrations, delusions, and paranoia (Albuquerque Police Department, 2013;
Lamb, Weinberger, & DeCuir, 2002; Reuland, 2004).
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Second, in combination with rules for recognizing abnormal behavior, officers are
asked to do their best to determine the degree of present danger and not to assume that
mental illness is inherently dangerous. Officers need to look for specific indications of
dangerousness, from the access to weapons and direct threats of violence or aggression to
known history of violence or aggression (Albuquerque Police Department, 2013; Lamb et
al., 2002; Reuland, 2004).
Finally, rules of engagement for handling suspects who are mentally ill often
require additional officers on the scene, including officers with specialized training or
supervisors. Officers are asked to move down the use-of-force continuum, if possible, to
de-escalate a suspect’s resistance. Successful de-escalation is accomplished, at least in
part, by establishing good communication with the suspect (Albuquerque Police
Department, 2013; Lamb et al., 2002; Reuland, 2004).
Beyond articulating specific policies for suspects who are mentally ill, police
departments are also increasingly providing their officers with general information about
mental illness and programs for police interactions with citizens who are mentally ill
(Hails & Borum, 2003). These programs are described in the following section.
Specialized law enforcement programs.
Three types of specialized program models exist to help police respond to calls
involving people who are mentally ill. These models include (a) specialized police
response programs designed by police, (b) police-based specialized mental-health
response programs, and (c) mental-health-based specialized mental-health response
programs (Hails & Borum, 2003). The first model is an in-house-based program with
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law enforcement officers serving as the initial mental-health crisis intervention team.
After stabilizing the scene, officers are asked to act as a liaison to an established mentalhealth center in the community. An example is the crisis intervention team (CIT) model
that originated in Memphis, Tennessee. The focus of CIT training is on training the
officers to identify individuals suffering from mental illness and increase their level of
confidence in responding. This model is associated with many favorable anecdotal
outcomes. It is also regularly modified to accommodate the demographics of the
population that is using it, for example, urban or rural settings and size of police force
(Watson et al., 2008).
The second program type, police-based specialized mental-health response
programs, is currently being used in 13% of police forces in the United States (Hails &
Borum, 2003). Some police departments refer to this program as mobile crisis units.
Such programs involve mental-health professionals who are employed by the police
department. These mental-health professionals, however, do not share the training and
status of police officers. Most have no police training. Their purpose is to provide onsite and in-field consultation to law enforcement (Hails & Borum, 2003).
The third type is a mental-health-based specialized mental-health response
program, often referred to as mobile mental-health crisis teams (MCTs). This model is
considered by some to be the most conventional, even though it is the least common type
of program (Aveni, 2003). Currently, only 8% of police departments employ this model,
although nearly 30% once used it. This model involves creating partnerships across
community mental-health organizations (Hails & Borum, 2003). It relies heavily on the

USE OF FORCE

21

interactions between local mental-health clinics and police departments, which often
engender complications. Research indicates that some of those complications are related
to the unfavorable view law enforcement holds of mental-health professionals (Borum,
2000).
The availability of specific policies and different program types suggests the
challenge facing municipal police departments. In particular, mental-health-care
institutions increasingly discharge patients who present compliance, health care, and
behavioral risks. These risks are revealed by the number of mentally ill persons whose
custody and care have migrated into the criminal-justice system (Markowitz, 2011).
Mental illness and stigma.
Mental illness is an epidemic in the United States. Millions of individuals are
suffering from different forms of mental illness. Data from the Substance Abuse and
Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA, 2015) indicate mental illness is
relatively stable in the United States population. Between 2008 and 2014, the number of
adult individuals with mental illness in the United States fluctuated approximately 1%.
Funding for mental-health services was projected to rise an estimated $170 billion from
2003 until 2014 (Levit et al., 2008). A Centers for Disease Control (CDC, 2015) report
from 2010 found that 63.3 million visits were made to physicians’ offices, emergency
rooms, and outpatient departments specifically related to mental disorders. The National
Institute of Mental Health (Insel, 2011) reported that mental disorders were more
expensive than the combined costs of treatment for malignant tumors, Type 1 and Type 2
diabetes, and respiratory disorders. The number of individuals suffering from mental
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illness is just as staggering. The National Alliance on Mental Health (NAMH, 2015)
reported that 43.8 million Americans, or one in five adults, suffer from some form of
mental illness. Mental illness ranges from mildly distressing to extremely consuming and
debilitating. Severe mental illness, as defined by SAMHSA (2015), is when an
individual is suffering from a mental, emotional, or behavioral disorder that significantly
interferes with one or more of his or her life activities. Ten million Americans met this
criterion, with 2.4 million Americans suffering from schizophrenia and 6.1 million
Americans suffering from bipolar disorder (NAMH, 2015). Research from NAMH
(2013) revealed that only a small percentage of those who are mentally ill are receiving
treatment.
Such laws as the Community Mental Health Centers Act of 1963 reduced the
resources available for those with mental illness. This legislation, and other federal,
state, and local laws, made receiving treatment all the more difficult. Prior to the 1960s,
large numbers of people who were mentally ill were treated in publicly funded mentalhealth hospitals (Borum, 2000). When funding was significantly reduced, however,
many of the patients living in these facilities had no other mental-health options. This
trend is evidenced by a decreasing number of available mental-health beds. In 1960,
approximately 314 beds were available per 100,000 people (Markowitz, 2011). By 1990,
after a majority of the mental-health funding had been cut, approximately 40 beds were
available per 100,000 people, and by 2005, only 17 beds were available per 100,000
people.
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The defunding of mental-health hospitals, also known as deinstitutionalization,
left many of those who resided in the hospitals without stable plans as to how to
transition to life outside of structured care (Borum, 2000). One-third of individuals who
met criteria for a mental illness were reported as homeless. Currently, 26% of adults with
mental illness reside in a homeless shelter (NAMI, 2015). Markowtiz (2011) wrote that
criminogenic environments are marked by mental illness and homelessness. These
environments explain, in part, the concerning rise in individuals with mental illness who
are residing in the criminal-justice system.
Remarkably, the criminal-justice system has taken in a significant portion of the
mentally ill population. Watson et al. (2008) went so far as to refer to police officers as
gatekeepers to both the mental-health and criminal-justice systems, elaborating that “the
large numbers of people with mental illness in jails and prisons has fueled policy concern
in all domains of the justice system” (p. 1). Of course, prisons and jails have assumed the
role of mental health hospitals in the past. In the early 19th century, jails and prisons were
the repositories of persons with mental illness. Eventually, in a time of widespread
change and mental-health reform, Americans regarded the institutionalization of persons
with mental illness in prison as inhumane. This change in public sentiment led to the
increased use of the now largely defunct mental hospitals (Torrey, Kennard, Eslinger,
Lamb, & Pavle, 2010).
The number of inmates who are severely mentally ill is now rising at an alarming
pace. Torrey et al. (2010) found that only 6.4% of inmates in the early 1980s were
mentally ill. Research conducted in 2010 found that the number of incarcerated
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individuals with mental illness had nearly tripled. In 2010, nearly one-fifth of
incarcerated individuals in the United States suffered from mental illness. Kim, BeckerCohen, and Serakos (2015) reported even more alarming numbers, finding that more than
half of state prisoners and local jail inmates had mental-health problems. Approximately
45% of all federal prisoners experience these problems as well. Perhaps most disturbing
is the fact that 70% of youths in the juvenile justice system have been diagnosed with
mental illness, and of those, 20% suffer from a severe mental illness (SAMHSA, 2015).
The space that these individuals consume is not the only problem created by this shift in
the criminal-justice system caring for persons who are mentally ill. Research by Goss,
Peterson, Smith, Kalb, and Brodey (2002) found three of four attempted suicides were
made by inmates with diagnosable mental illness.
The mental-health stigma in the criminal-justice system is far from surprising
when one realizes the challenges of serving the care, custody, and control needs of
persons who are mentally ill, often with limited space and resources. This stigma is
likely to impact the actions of all criminal-justice functionaries (e.g., use of force by
police, competency decisions by courts, and classification of inmates by risk level in
correctional institutions). This stigma may have far-reaching effects, including
discrimination, limited opportunities, inadequate access to health care, and
marginalization in society.
Mental-health stigma and differential treatment.
Historically, persons who are mentally ill have experienced discrimination and
stigmatization across a wide range of settings (Hinshaw & Stier, 2008). The collective
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concern about both discrimination and stigmatization was so great in 1999 that the United
States Surgeon General recognized mental-health stigma as a barrier to opportunities and
treatment for those with mental illness (Corrigan, Markowitz, Watson, Rowan, & Kubiak,
2003). The report found that the stigma of mental illness had longstanding iterative,
tautological effects, from the initial stigma to poor treatment, followed by feelings of
demoralization, low self-esteem, and internalization of the stigma, to the reinforcement of
those feelings by external stigma. The practical impact of this reinforcing circular
stigmatization includes challenges in obtaining housing and employment and far less than
fair and just interactions with law enforcement (Hinshaw & Stier, 2008).
Perceptions of mental illness, its meaning and effects, are constantly evolving. In
the early 1950s, the public’s awareness of mental illness was minimal (Markowitz, 2011).
Survey research at the time revealed that most Americans associated mental illness with a
generic, lay conception of psychosis, revealing a very narrow conception of
psychopathology. Four and a half decades later, the same survey was conducted again
(Markowitz, 2011). This time, respondents revealed a more informed and progressive
view of mental illness, with only 35% believing that mental illness is simply a psychosis.
Respondents also noted that depression, anxiety, substance use, and more persistent lifelong disorders, such as personality disorders, were types of mental illness (Markowitz,
2011). A study conducted in the late 1990s by Markowitz (2011) gave subjects vignettes
of individuals with three types of illness: depression, schizophrenia, and substance abuse.
Of the sample, 88% correctly identified schizophrenia and 96% correctly diagnosed
depression. When asked if subjects believed that these illnesses were caused by external
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factors, most of the sample believed that the illnesses were outside of one’s control and
did not reflect poorly on one’s character.
Many studies show a significant increase in the awareness of mental health and
mental-health diseases. This rising awareness, though, is contemporaneous with beliefs
that mental illness is highly correlated with violence, unpredictability, and
dangerousness. According to Martin, Pescosolido, and Tuch (2000), attitudes and
conceptions of mental illness are changing. Martin et al. observed that the number of
respondents who connect mental illness with violence has nearly doubled in the past 50
years. They wrote that those who equate mental illness with psychosis tend to attribute
dangerousness to the mentally ill and generally reject them in every aspect of life. The
intuition that the increases in the association between violence and dangerousness in
persons who are mentally ill are tied to media and fictional portrayals of mental illness is
fair and worthy of empirical exploration.
Criminalization hypothesis.
The perception of individuals who are mentally ill as criminals is referred to as
the criminalization hypothesis. Engel and Silver (2001) assumed the position that some
police attribute a quasi-criminal or criminal label to persons with mental illness.
According to Engel and Silver), evidence in support of this hypothesis may be divided
into three parts. First, a disproportionate number of persons who are mentally ill are in
each and every stage of the criminal-justice system. Second, the very specific number of
former mental-health arrestees reflects this hypothesis. Third, the arrest rates of suspects
who are mentally disordered far exceed the rates for those who are not mentally
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disordered. A growing but contested stream of research reveals that suspects with signs
of mental illness are much more likely than those without such signs to be arrested. A
less contentious but growing body of work grounds intuitions and hypotheses about
suspects with mental illness and their treatment in leading psychological theories.
Theories.
Social cognitive model.
A significant percentage of police work involves contact with individuals who are
suffering from a serious mental illness in the role of suspect, victim, or witness. The
erratic behavior of an individual who is severely mentally ill can be unpredictable,
prompting a deviation from the formal training of a criminal-justice functionary. Often,
police officers must use a heuristic to predict a suspect’s next response. Officers
frequently engage in behavior consistent with attribution theory. This theory is closely
associated with the social cognitive model. This intuitive model simply proposes that
individuals learn by observing others and that their perspective is taken from their own
social sphere and world view. Corrigan (2000) offered an analogy of a social cognitive
model for individuals with mental illness, concluding “persons with severe mental illness
signal the public about their mental illness. These signals yield stereotypes about persons
with mental illness. Stereotypes lead to behavioral reactions or discrimination” (p. 49).
An example of a signal is a person talking to him or herself. That signal would produce a
stereotype of “crazy people are erratic.” This stereotype might produce a behavioral
response that could manifest in people avoiding individuals who are mentally ill. This
response would likely result in one or more forms of discrimination.
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Attribution theory.
Attribution theory is used to describe the thought processes behind police
interactions with civilians, particularly those with mental illness. Fritz Heider’s 1958
attribution theory is a widely influential theory that explains the process of understanding
the behavior of others (Weiner, 2008). Corrigan (2000) conceived of attribution theory
as “fundamentally a model of human motivation and emotion based on the assumption
that individuals search for causal understanding of everyday events” (p. 52). This theory,
although not currently a dominant paradigm, has been subjected to active hypothesis
testing over the course of the past nearly 60 years. Many researchers believe that healthy
and adaptive behavior is characterized by attributions. The critical piece of the theory is
that it assesses for perceptions or what some describe as achievement outcomes (Weiner,
2008). Malle (2004) described reasons, or ascriptions, as commonplace justifications for
ordinary behavior. However, attributions, or outcomes, are conceived to be less common
in straightforward psychology. Attribution theory is focused solely on causes.
Attribution theory captures the idea of agency and what is referred to in the
literature as locus of control. Heider first spoke about this concept in his seminal 1958
book as loci, which translates to can. He believed that ability, loci, was centered on the
individual’s internal state, while task difficulty was more attributable to external factors
and influences. Rotter (1954) conceptualized locus of control and used the more
common terminology of internal and external locus of control. Rotter wrote that the idea
of locus of control reflects individuals’ perceptions of an event and their belief in the
level of their control. Ability was referred to as internal locus of control, meaning that
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individuals perceive that they have agency over an event, situation, or life circumstance.
Task difficulty was slightly changed, resulting in the name external locus of control,
meaning that individuals perceive that they have little to no control over the events in
their lives and that fate, environment, or chance dictates the outcome of their life
circumstances.
Rotter’s theory is used in police use-of-force literature and the study of suspects
who are mentally ill. Corrigan (2000) reported that “research has found significant
associations for controllability attributions about mental illness and two emotional
reactions: anger and pity” (p. 55). Watson et al. (2004) reported the following:
According to attribution theory, persons who are viewed as responsible for
negative situations (e.g., not having a way to get home) are more likely to be
reacted to with anger and punished or denied help. Conversely, individuals who
are not believed to be in control of a negative situation are pitied by others and
helped. (p. 379)
Watson et al. (2004) conducted a study using vignettes that were given to police
officers with the content detailing how the label of mental illness influences attribution,
affect, and perception. In this study, police officers attributed less blame to and felt more
empathy for subjects with schizophrenia. At the same time, they considered subjects
with schizophrenia more dangerous than individuals without severe mental illness. Ruiz
(1993) also reported that officers erroneously believed that suspects who are mentally ill
are more dangerous than their non-mentally-ill counterparts. Watson et al. (2004)
reported the following:
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Fear of personal injury and a lack of understanding and empathy on the part of
officers, combined with the difficulty or reluctance to comply with instructions on
the part of the person with mental illness, are the two leading causes of violent
confrontations between the two. (p. 379)
Part of this misconception has been linked to a lack of information about suspects
who are mentally ill that produces negative attitudes of police toward those suspects
(Borum, 2000). Ultimately, a police officer is more likely to have empathy for a suspect
who is mentally ill when the idea of mental illness is understood, the suspect’s demeanor
is nonthreatening and nonhostile, and, at the same time, the officer perceives some
control over his or her presence at the scene of a crime. All of these factors will likely
influence the officer’s responses to suspects who are mentally ill. The first option is to
simply do nothing, essentially ignoring that the situation has occurred. The second
option is to take the suspect into custody. The third option is to not arrest the suspect
and, instead, informally resolve the matter. The last option is to come to some other kind
of “formal resolution,” such as seeking involuntary commitment if the suspect appears to
be a danger to him or herself or others. Law enforcement perceptions, attitudes, and
situational factors influence decision making.
Summary
The criminal-justice system in the United States is known for problems associated
with race-based decision making (Adler et al., 2016). Far less is known about how
individuals with mental illness are perceived and treated by criminal-justice functionaries
across the entire system—from the initial point of contact (police) to classification
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decisions in state correctional institutions. This dissertation explores the reactions of
police to suspects who are mentally ill versus suspects who are not mentally ill. More
specifically, this study determines whether these differences lead officers to stray from
the force continuum and whether certain factors moderate this effect. First responders
must determine whether a criminal wrongdoing has occurred; who is responsible;
whether the responsible party should be detained, placed in custody, and possibly
removed from the scene; and the kind of force, if any, that is necessary and justifiable.
When a suspect suffers from a mental illness, all of these decisions are made more
difficult. No single decision is more important or has greater consequences than police
use of force.
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Chapter 2. Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1
H1: It is hypothesized that officers exposed to vignettes involving suspects
displaying signs of mental illness will use greater force compared to officers exposed to
vignettes involving suspects displaying no signs of mental illness.
Rationale for H1: Law enforcement officers are often in situations where they
must decide whether to use force against a suspect’s resistance and the amount of force
that is justified. Suspects who suffer from overt mental illness make those decisions
much more difficult. Kaminski et al. (2004) found that when interacting with impaired
suspects, either under the influence of a substance or displaying a mental illness, officers
are more likely to use force as compared to when interacting with nonimpaired suspects.
Watson et al. (2004) found that law enforcement officers perceive suspects displaying
signs of mental illness as more hostile and threatening than their non-mentally ill
counterparts.
Hypothesis 2
H2: It is hypothesized that officers exposed to vignettes involving suspects
displaying signs of mental illness will experience a higher degree of negative affect
compared to officers exposed to vignettes involving suspects displaying no signs of
mental illness.
Rationale for H2: Increased force might, in part, be the result of officers
associating mental illness with a negative connotation (Borum, 2000). These behaviors
stem from a widely held belief that police techniques and commands that are commonly
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used in police-suspect interactions are ineffective with persons who are mentally ill
(Watson et al., 2008). These negative and ill-informed behaviors and beliefs result from
a lack of training on the topic of mental illness (Borum, 2000).
Exploratory Analyses
In addition, exploratory analyses were conducted to examine the association of
officer characteristics (i.e., age, years of service, empathy, and attitudes toward mental
illness) with use of force. These analyses follow up on research indicating that certain
officer characteristics may influence the way officers perceive suspects who are mentally
ill. For example, Watson et al. (2004) reported that officers who had less formal training
with suspects who were mentally ill and were younger perceived suspects with mental
illness as much more dangerous and aggressive than their non-mentally ill counterparts.
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Chapter 3. Methodology

Overview
This dissertation examines the perceived reasonableness of police use of force
when an officer faces resistance from suspects whose behavior suggests mental illness.
The central question posed is whether police officers are more likely to deviate from the
prescribed force continuum when interacting with apparently mentally ill versus
apparently non-mentally ill suspects. This dissertation also explores police officers’
levels of affect, empathy, and attitudes toward mental illness.
Design and Design Justification
This dissertation is based on archival data from a larger host study on police use
of force sponsored by a regional police agency with headquarters in a large city in the
Mid-Atlantic region of the United States. This study’s design includes a randomized
between-group repeated-measures ANOVA.
Participants
In the first quarter of 2016, in response to increasing public scrutiny of stop-andfrisk and police use-of-force decision making, the chief of the police agency initiated a
series of studies on policing and the Fourth Amendment. The objective of this research
program was to proactively examine some of the challenges of an urban police
department in balancing the need for effective law enforcement with the civil rights and
liberties of citizens. This research program included an examination of the level of
substantive criminal-law knowledge by patrol officers in relation to stop-and-frisk
decisions, the effect of body cameras on the exercise of police use of force, the role of
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race and gender in police use-of-force decisions, and how police officers perceive use-offorce decisions with suspects and citizens who present as mentally ill.
This dissertation uses archival data from the administration of a survey of police
officers regarding suspects and citizens with mental illness for this last research
project. Participants were 140 officers (N = 140) randomly drawn from all ranks,
from patrol officers to those reporting directly to the chief of police.
Inclusion criteria for participants from the larger study were sworn officers of any
rank in this regional police department. No exclusion criteria were used if the inclusion
criteria were met.
Measures: Primary Outcomes
Vignettes and questions.
Participants responded to two hypothetical scenarios of criminal acts occurring in
two different settings, both involving unlawful behavior engaged in by an individual
displaying either overt signs of mental illness or no signs of mental illness. Specifically,
the first vignette involved an individual avoiding the fare on a train and brandishing a
knife. The second vignette involved an individual attempting to break in to a cash
register in a Dunkin Donuts. Signs of mental illness found in the hypothetical scenarios
were taken from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.;
DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) sections on Schizophrenia Spectrum
and Other Psychotic Disorders. The settings of the scenarios were selected and adapted
from archival transit police reports involving a “302 Petition” during the 2015 calendar
year. A “302 Petition” is an authorization for law enforcement, physicians, or a county
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mental-health officer who seeks involuntary emergency evaluation of an individual for a
period of no longer than 5 days. Scenarios were rated by three senior police officers of
different ranks for their representativeness and were selected on that basis, i.e., the extent
to which scenarios were “typical” of police interactions with suspects who are mentally
ill. Questions following the factual scenarios asked participants to consider (a) the
number of verbal warnings or commands that the officer should employ before escalating
any force response and (b) what the officer’s next response should be if those verbal
warnings or commands did not work. These responses were subsequently coded by two
blind raters, who sorted them into one of five level-of-force categories. Discrepancies
were reconciled by an independent third rater. Raters used the National Institute of
Justice Force Continuum (NIJ, 2015) as a guide for rating decisions.
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule.
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen,
1988), a 20-item mood scale, was administered to all participants. Ten questions pertain
to positive affect and 10 questions consider negative affect. Positive affect (PA)
descriptors include attentive, interested, alert, excited, enthusiastic, inspired, proud,
determined, strong, and active. Negative affect (NA) consists of five categories that each
contain two terminologies: distressed and upset (distressed category), hostile and irritable
(angry category), scared and afraid (fearful category), ashamed and guilty (guilty
category), and nervous and jittery (jittery category). Participants were asked to rate their
level of association, in the present moment, with the words presented to them using a 5point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (very slight or not at all) to 5 (extremely). The
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PANAS asks participants to rate their level of affect, how they feel, during a variety of
different points in time, including the present moment, today, past few days, past few
weeks, past year, and, generally. For the purpose of the present study, participants rated
the extent to which they felt a particular way in the present moment.
Measures of reliability for the different time points using coefficient alpha are
both consistent and significant, with an alpha of .89 for present-moment PA and .88 for
past-year PA. Negative affect results were similar, with past-moment ratings of .85 and
past-year ratings of .87 (Watson et al., 1988). The PANAS allows for scoring
independently for the dichotomous dimensions: positive affect and negative affect.
Scores for each dimension range from 10 to 50, with low levels of negative affect
revealed by lower scores and with high levels of positive affect denoted by higher scores.
Watson et al.’s (1988) initial study on reliability found significant internal consistency in
a nonclinical sample. Alphas ranged from .86 to.89 for PA and from .84 to .87 for NA.
Additionally, a negative correlation was found between PA and NA, showing dimensions
as orthogonal. Watson et al. summarized that “the PANAS scales provide reliable,
precise, and largely independent measures of Positive Affect and Negative Affect,
regardless of the subject population studied or the time frame and response format used”
(p. 1067).
Measures: Correlations
The interpersonal reactivity index.
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) is a 28-item scale that measures
cognitive and emotional empathy using a multidimensional approach (Davis, 1980). This
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measure is unique because it looks at both cognitive and emotional empathy, while extant
measures are able to examine only one form of an individual’s empathic responses
(Davis, 1983). The IRI is comprised of four subscales. Each subscale consists of as
many as seven questions. The subscales are (a) perspective-taking (PT; how participants
attempt to embrace the views of others), (b) fantasy (FS; how participants assume the
perspective of fictional characters), (c) empathic concern (EC; how participants reveal
concern and compassion for others), and (d) personal distress (PD; how participants
express negative feelings, such as anxiety, as a result of the negative feelings of others).
An example of a PT question is, “I try to look at everybody’s side of a
disagreement before I make a decision.” An example of an FS question is, “I daydream
and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might happen to me.” An example
of an EC question is, “I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate
than me.” An example of a PD question is, “In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive
and ill-at-ease.”
Participants are asked to rate the extent to which the statement describes them
using a 5-point Likert-type scale from A (does not describe me well) to E (describes me
very well). Scores for each subscale range from 0 to 28, and some of the items are
reverse scored. The IRI is not designed to offer a global measure of empathy. Rather,
each subscale score is examined individually to increase the precision of detecting
different forms of empathy. The IRI is also not designed to be interpreted in
dichotomous terms, i.e., high versus low empathy. Instead this inventory assesses the
score as a continuous variable of empathy (Konrath, 2013).
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Although the literature about empathy, gender differences, and the measurement
of both contains much discussion and debate, women consistently score higher in all
subscales, consistent with much prior research. When examining the convergent validity
of the IRI, PT was associated with cognitive empathy, and emotional empathy was
positively correlated with EC. Concurrent validity was found in similarly expected ways;
the subscales EC and PT were associated with more positive features, that is, high selfesteem and positive social functioning (Konrath, 2013). In terms of test-retest reliability,
results from the IRI are statistically stable. Davis (1980) used the IRI with a sample of
109 undergraduate students to examine reliability over time (i.e., a lapse of 60-75 days).
He observed correlations ranging from .61 to .79 for male students, and correlations
ranging from .62 to .81 for female students. There is significant evidence of the internal
reliability of the IRI. Researchers found that the alpha coefficients of male and female
students never varied more than .3 from each other at any given time and that all subscale
scores fell between .70 and .78 (Davis, 1980).
Attitudes toward mental illness.
This scale consists of a two-statement measure that assesses attitudes toward
mental illness (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention et al., 2012). It is widely used
in diverse populations to assess lay persons’ feelings about mental illness, is measured on
a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Agree Strongly).
The two statements are “Treatment can help people with mental illness lead normal lives”
and “People are generally caring and sympathetic to people with mental illness.” This
measure was included in the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS),
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which collects information throughout the United States on health behaviors, risks,
prevention, and practices. This measure has acceptable construct validity in determining
attitudes toward recovery from mental illness (Kobau, Diiorio, Chapman, & Delvecchio,
2010).
Demographic information.
Information was gathered through a demographic questionnaire that asked
various questions about: age, years on the force, training, and previous use of a weapon.
Demographic questions were selected that were associated in prior research more
generally with police use of force.
Procedure
A sample of transit police officers completed a battery of questions, scales, and
assessment materials as part of a larger host study exploring a series of Fourth
Amendment challenges to law enforcement. All the data collected from the larger host
study were coded and prepared for analysis. A smaller data set was created for this
dissertation from the larger data set.
Data collection took place in the police headquarters in March 2016. This police
department is an urban and regional transportation agency and authority. The department
offers public transportation ranging from buses and subways to commuter rail service.
Participants received the questionnaires for this subset of the research program over a
period of 4 weeks (in groups of 20 participants over the course of a month). They were
given an overview of the larger research initiative, at which point informed consent was
obtained. Participants were told that, as part of a larger police research initiative (“host
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study”), officers would be asked to respond to a number of fact patterns regarding their
feelings and perceptions.
The survey consisted of three parts. All participants were asked to complete the
survey in order of Parts 1, 2, and 3, without skipping or jumping sections. In Part 1, the
participants were given two vignettes to read with questions that needed to be answered
related to the corresponding vignette. They were asked to complete the PANAS
immediately after responding to both of the use-of-force vignettes. The second part
contained two measures, the IRI and Attitudes Toward Mental Illness. This section was
intended to gain information on qualities and characteristics related to policing that were
unique to the officer. Last, in Part 3, participants were asked a variety of demographic
questions related to their personal experiences.
When completed, questionnaires were returned face down to a bin. All
participants received a letter describing the study and larger research program in greater
detail, with instructions for obtaining a summary of the results, once completed, along
with contact information to use to obtain answers to any additional questions.
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Chapter 4. Results

Power Analysis
With an alpha of .05 and estimating a medium effect size of .4, a total sample size
of 140 (70 per condition) was determined to be required to obtain statistical power of .80
for the primary hypothesis (Cohen, 1988).
Descriptive Statistics and Randomization
A total of 140 transit officer participants were asked to read two vignettes that
involved hypothetical scenarios in which they were encountering an individual engaging
in a criminal activity. Participants were randomly assigned, in blocks of 10 (to ensure
relatively equal group sizes), to read either two vignettes involving perpetrators
displaying overt signs of mental illness (n = 72, 51.4% ― experimental condition) or two
vignettes involving perpetrators engaged in the same criminal acts but not displaying any
signs of mental illness (n = 68, 48.6% ― control condition). As displayed in Table 1,
study participants had a mean age of 39.77 years (SD = 9.4 years) and a mean length of
service of 12.37 years (SD = 8.5 years). All but two of the participants who reported their
gender were male (98.3%, n = 118). Of the participants, 48% (n = 60) had a formal
record of disciplinary action, 75% (n = 98) had taken their service gun out of its holster at
least once in the course of duty, 94% (n = 123) had presented or used a police-issued
weapon (e.g., baton, Taser, or chemical spray) at least once in the course of duty, and
14% (n = 16) reported a history of personal mental-health issues.

USE OF FORCE

43

Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Variables

N

Sample
%/M(SD)

1
58

1%
47%

29
31

23%
25%

5

4%

Yes

46

55%

White

73

67%

Black/African
American
Other

22

20%

14

13%

Male
Female

118
2

98%
.02%

Yes

60

48%

Yes

98

75%

Yes

123

94%

Personal MentalHealth History
(n = 117)
Yes

16

14%

Highest Grade
Completed
(n = 124)
GED
HS diploma
Associates
Bachelor’s
Postgraduate
Crisis Training
(n = 83)
Ethnicity
(n = 109)

Gender
(n = 120)

Formally
Disciplined
(n = 125)
Firearm Out
(n = 131)

Weapon Out
(n = 131)

Age

39.77 (9.4)

Years Served
12.37 (8.5)
Note: GED = general equivalency diploma. HS = high school.
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A check of randomization revealed that the variance in these demographic
variables was equally distributed across the two study conditions. As shown in Table 1,
no significant between-group effects were found for age, F(1, 110) = .84, p = .36; gender,
χ2 (1, 140) = 2.2, p = .23; ethnicity, χ2 (2, 140) = 2.2, p = 33; years of service, F(1, 115) =
.92, p = .34; years of education, χ2 (4, 140) = 3.1, p = .54; prior crisis training, χ2 (1, 140)
= 1.3, p =18; history of formal discipline, χ2 ( 1, 140) = .62, p = .27; prior withdrawal of a
firearm, χ2 (1, 140) = .16, p = 1.5; prior withdrawal of a weapon, χ2 (1, 140) = 0.12, p =
.60; or personal history of mental illness, χ2 (1, 140) = .93, p = .24.
Assumptions
Generally, five assumptions should be satisfied for a two-way repeated-measures
ANOVA: (a) it must have a continuous dependent variable (force, negative affect), (b) it
must have two within-subject factors where each factor consists of two or more levels, (c)
it must not have significant outliers in any cells of the data (combinations of the two
within-subject factors), (d) the dependent variable should be approximately normally
distributed for each of the independent variables, and (e) variance of the differences
between levels should be equal (i.e., assumption of homogeneity of variances).
The first two assumptions listed were met as a result of the design. Regarding the
third assumption, there were no outliers as assessed by examination of the studentized
residuals for values ± 3. There were lower ratings of use of force for the train vignette
for three participants, who reported their use of force as a 1 (officer presence). In the
Dunkin Donuts vignette, two participants reported their use of force as a 2
(verbalization). For the fourth assumption, the amount of force for the train vignette
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(vignette 1) in the control condition had a skewness of -2.52 (SE = .29) and kurtosis of
8.82 (SE = .57). The amount of force in the train vignette in the experimental condition
had a skewness of -2.01 (SE = .28) and kurtosis of 4.28 (SE = .56). The amount of force
in the Dunkin Donuts vignette for the control condition had a skewness of -1.27 (SE =
.29) and kurtosis of 1.87 (SE = .57). The amount of force for the experimental condition
of the Dunkin Donuts vignette produced a skewness of -1.67 (SE = .28) and kurtosis of
4.30 (SE = .56). These results, in combination with visual observation of the distribution,
indicate that the results were negatively skewed. The two-way repeated-measures
ANOVA procedure, however, is considered relatively robust to violations of normality.
For reasons offered by the central limit theorem, the two-way repeated-measures
ANOVA typically still provides valid results with larger sample sizes. Regarding the
fifth assumption, the sphericity of the interaction effect was not significant (p = .25),
indicating that the assumption of sphericity for the two-way interaction (condition by
vignette) was not violated.
Hypothesis 1
A two-way ANOVA with repeated measures on one factor was conducted to
determine whether there was a statistical significance on use of force between transit
officers reading a vignette involving an encounter with a suspect engaging in illegal
activity with or without overt signs of mental illness. The independent variable included
a between-subjects variable, signs of mental illness, and a within-subject variable, two
different vignettes. The dependent variable was the degree of force that was selected in
response to the offender’s behavior. An alpha level of .05 was used for this analysis.
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Table 2
Repeated-Measures ANOVA: Main and Interaction Effects—Use of Force
Variables

N

df

F

Sig.

Vignette X condition

140

1

1.36

.25

Vignette

140

1

87.33

< .001

Condition

140

1

1.36

.25

Hypothesis 2
A two-way ANOVA with repeated measures on one factor was conducted to
determine whether there was a statistical significance on negative affect between transit
officers reading a vignette involving an encounter with a suspect engaging in illegal
activity with or without overt signs of mental illness. The independent variable included
a between-subjects variable, signs of mental illness, and a within-subject variable, two
different vignettes. The dependent variable was officers’ degree of negative affect that
was experienced in response to the suspect’s behavior. An alpha level of .05 was used
for this analysis. Results for model assumptions of normality, homogeneity of
covariance, and linearity were satisfactory. There was no statistically significant
interaction in the amount of force used between the conditions and the vignettes, F(1,
139) = .37, p = .54 (see Figure 2). The result of the main effect of the vignettes was
significant, F(1, 139) = 14.12, p < .001, but there was no significant between-group main
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Table 3
Repeated- Measures ANOVA: Main and Interaction Effects – Negative Affect
Variables

N

df

F

Sig.

Vignette X condition

140

1

.67

.42

Vignette

140

1

14.12

< .001

Condition

140

1

.37

.54

illness”), (f) years of service, and (g) age. As depicted in Table 4, significant positive
correlations were found for the amount of force in the train vignette and the amount of
force in the Dunkin Donut vignette, r = .25, p < .003; empathic concern and attitude
toward mental illness (“Treatment can help people with mental illness lead normal
lives”), r = 2.79, p < .001; empathic concern and attitude toward mental illness (“People
are generally caring and sympathetic to people with mental illness”), r = .171, p < .043;
and years of service and age, r = .847, p < .000. Bivariate correlations were run
individually for experimental and control conditions but revealed similar correlations
with significance on the same variables as the entire sample. Moderator analyses were
not conducted because there were no significant differences in correlations across
conditions and/or significant between-condition effects.
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Table 4
Inter-item Correlations: Demographic and Dependent Variables
Variable

Use of
force:
train
1

Use of
force:
Dunkin

.25**

1

Empathic
concern

.03

.02

1

Attitudes
toward
MI 1a

.09

-.03

.28**

1

Attitudes
toward
MI 2b

-.12

.02

.17*

.15

1

Years of
service

-.13

.02

-.12

.03

-.03

1

Age

-.11

.02

.01

.09

-.01

.85**

Use of
force:
train
Use of
force:
Dunkin

Empathic
concern

Attitudes
toward
MI 1

Attitudes
toward
MI 2

Years of
service

a

Age

1

Attitudes toward MI 1 represents Question 1: “Treatment can help people with mental
illness lead normal lives.”
b

Attitudes toward MI 2 represents Question 2: “People are generally caring and
sympathetic to people with mental illness.”
* p < .05, two-tailed. ** p < .01, two-tailed.
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Chapter 5. Discussion

At about 10:45 p.m. on October 3, 1974, Memphis Police Officers Elton Hymon
and Leslie Wright were dispatched to answer a “prowler inside call.” A suspect
pushed past the conductor on Warminster Train #402, stating that he was not
going to pay. He then took a seat on the train. You, the assigned officer, were
called to the car by the conductor and observed the suspect, who was approaching
passengers and screaming, “I bless you as the son of God. I forgive you, you
must atone for your sins!” As the passengers did nothing, the suspect became
more agitated, stuttering, spitting, and throwing his fists in the air. When the
suspect saw you, he took out and began waving a knife that had previously been
concealed in his back pocket. The suspect growled and shouted an incoherent
string of words and positioned his body to lunge at you. You assumed a defensive
position after quickly moving passengers as far away from the suspect as possible.
Do police officers think that the use of greater force is justified with suspects who
display signs of mental illness as compared with suspects who display no signs of mental
illness? Do officers who read vignettes involving suspects displaying signs of mental
illness experience a higher degree of negative affect compared to officers exposed to
vignettes involving suspects displaying no signs of mental illness? These questions
capture the two central hypotheses in this dissertation.
The first hypothesis predicted that officers exposed to vignettes involving
suspects displaying signs of mental illness will use greater force compared to officers
exposed to vignettes involving suspects displaying no signs of mental illness. However,
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the findings failed to support this hypothesis, as officers in both conditions used similar
levels of force, with officers in both conditions using more force in the vignette in which
the suspect brandished a weapon (knife).
Hypothesis 2 predicted that officers exposed to vignettes involving suspects
displaying signs of mental illness will experience a higher degree of negative affect
compared to officers exposed to vignettes involving suspects displaying no signs of
mental illness. This hypothesis was also not supported, as no between-condition
differences were found for negative affect.
Finally, the exploratory analyses found no significant relationship between officer
characteristics (i.e., age, years of service, empathy, and attitudes toward mental illness)
and use of force in either vignette.
The assumptions behind Hypotheses 1 (H1) and 2 (H2) anticipate behavioral and
affective variation on the part of participants in responding to vignettes in which suspects
display overt signs of mental illness or no overt signs of mental illness. The behavioral
differences anticipated with H1 included the kind of variation in perceived reasonableness
of the use of force that compensates for expected gaps in rationality found in suspects in
the experimental condition. H2 assumed that the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
(PANAS) would reveal the kind of affective differences that reflect a participant’s ability
or inability to confront, tolerate, and accommodate behavior associated with mental
illness. These assumptions, and others, may have taken the form of four outcomes that
include accommodation, which is a form of recognition of mental illness, and
compensation, which is the calibration of force levels: Over Accommodate/Compensate;
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Under Accommodate/Compensate; Reasonably Accommodate/Compensate; and Don’t
Accommodate/Compensate (reflecting the results of this dissertation).
In spite of some strong support in the literature for both H1 and H2, the results fail
to reject the null hypothesis. Interpretation of the results of this study show either that the
methods and approaches to examine the alternative hypotheses are inadequate or, more
concerning, police do not consider or take into account the mental-health status of
suspects. If the former, distinct lessons are to be learned from the methods used or not
used in this study. These lessons include considerations regarding the coding used, a
ceiling effect from “overly severe vignettes,” vignettes that fail to capture the complexity
of real-world interactions, and/or the fact that both vignettes involved suspects attempting
to attack the responding officer.
If the latter, however, officer training and awareness of mental illness must be
promptly and directly addressed (Morabito et al., 2012). Police are legally obligated to
use the amount of force “that represents the minimal amount of force necessary to reduce
the immediate threat” (Philadelphia Police Department, 2015). How is the threat
assessed? Beyond matters of training and awareness, these finding may raise significant
legal concerns. After all, the use of force by police is judged, at least legally, by the
objective test (i.e., intuitions about the reasonable calculations of an average officer) of
what “reasonable” officers would have thought and felt in like circumstances. If officers
do not, in fact, accommodate or compensate in reasonable ways to mental illness, little to
no constitutional constraints will be placed on their use of force. That is, the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution would not be offended by officer
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overcompensation (i.e., the use of too much force) and no compensation (i.e., neglecting
the mental-health status of the suspect). The results of this dissertation, therefore, leave
open the possibility that the mental-health status of suspects may be entirely incidental to
any judgment of the reasonableness of a police officer’s use of force.
If police officers ignore the rationality of suspects with mental illness, they may
be disregarding, more generally, the many psychological and behavioral differences
associated with mental illnesses. This disregard, if true, would lend support to a societal
neglect and social stigma of mental illness (Corrigan, 2004; Corrigan & Gelb, 2006).
Of course, use-of-force decision making should not be seen in isolation. Instead,
people with mental illness, from offender to complainant, victim, and person in need
come into contact with functionaries at every stage of the criminal-justice system. With
each call for service, unique challenges extend the role of and challenge the capability of
first responders. This role and associated challenges are recognized by specific
departmental rules and directives cautioning officers, for example, that “Suspects may be
physically or mentally incapable of responding to police commands due to a variety of
circumstances including but not limited to alcohol or drugs, mental impairment, medical
conditions, or language or cultural barriers. Officers should be mindful of this when
making use-of-force decisions” (Philadelphia Police Department, 2015).
One reason mental illness may not have produced the hypothesized effects is that
officers might have, to some degree, habituated to irrational behavior. Through
experience interacting with people with mental illness, training, or both, police may
already assume that many individuals act irrationally (Kaminski et al., 2004; Mulvey &
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White, 2014). Relatedly, the results also may be explained by the possibility that
interactions with suspects who are mentally ill are largely indistinguishable from those
with suspects without a mental illness (Kerr, Morabito, & Watson, 2010). Alternatively,
the fact that large police departments respond to thousands of calls about “emotionally
disturbed persons” each year may result in routinized police responses to suspects
presenting with less than rational behavior. Routinization, consistent with the
criminalization hypothesis, may dull, if not mute, police responses to possible resistance
from suspects who are mentally ill (Morabito, 2007).
The failure of support for the dissertation’s two hypotheses may be explained by
the theory of procedural justice. Officers certainly may extend a brand of procedural
fairness to all suspects, including those who are mentally ill, in ways that actively
diminish the resistance of suspects while improving overall cooperation. Watson and
Angell (2007) made a convincing case that suspect perceptions of fairness and justice are
key to improved outcomes from police interactions with suspects who are mentally ill.
These authors noted, for example, that “(I)n the content of a procedural justice
framework, the focus is on the subjective experience of the process of the interaction with
authority (such as ‘The officer treated me fairly’) rather than satisfaction with the
outcome (such as ‘The officer should not have arrested me’; Watson & Angell, 2007, p.
789).
Upon reflection, the authors noted that officers’ use of force did not vary as a
function of the suspect’s presentation of mental illness. Ideally, for reasons of
substantive fairness, police would not discriminate against suspects on the basis of their
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mental status. Use-of-force decisions would be made by police officers who are well
trained and able to make force decisions based on the suspect’s mental status, level of
resistance, and threat. In this ideal world, mental status would be recognized as but one
of many presenting characteristics of a suspect, not as the defining one or one that is
guided by stigma and unjustified predispositions.
One should note that the average number of warnings issued by officers differed
between the train and Dunkin Donuts vignettes. Justifiably, the average number of
warnings was greater in the train vignette (M = 1.65) than in the Dunkin Donut vignette
(M = 1.01) because the train vignette involved a deadly weapon. Greater force was used
in the train vignette, with more resistance from the suspect and with greater potential
risks of injuries to police and others, thus justifying additional warnings. This may seem
counterintuitive, but additional warnings are generally given to suspects as they move up
the force continuum.
Study Limitations
As with all empirical research, possible threats to internal and external validity
must also be considered. These threats may be magnified when analyzing secondary or
archival data, where samples are drawn from “special” populations, and when
psychometric measures and vignette surveys are used. After a brief discussion of
possible study limitations, more substantive explanations for failing to reject the null
hypothesis will be considered. The ways in which this research should inspire future
work, including studies on diversity questions, will conclude the chapter.
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Vignettes.
One factor that may have diminished the internal validity of study findings is the
use of vignettes. Officers possibly may respond differently to suspect resistance in a
vignette than they would on the scene. Also, vignettes may fail to capture the factual or
ecological complexity of real-world interactions between police and suspects. These
possibilities raise reasonable concerns about the internal and external validity of the
findings. To address these concerns, this study (a) relied on interrater measures of
vignette realism by a panel of three officers from different ranks and (b) drafted vignettes
directly from the 2015 police case files, a year-long record of all cases during which
officers interacted with suspects with an apparent mental illness.
Of course, no matter how factually accurate the vignettes are, police interactions
with suspects, including those who are mentally ill, may evoke unique concerns for the
officer’s own safety or the safety of others not evoked by the vignettes. Actual use-offorce decisions are made in real-world contexts that may be impossible to completely
recreate in a vignette questionnaire, no matter how factually realistic. However, a
substantial body of research over more than 4 decades provides strong support for the
value of vignette research methods, notwithstanding concerns with external validity
(Gould, 1996; Hughes & Huby, 2004).
Police interactions with persons who are mentally ill are increasing but are still
relatively rare. So, too, is the resort to more serious force, most particularly deadly force.
For many participants, therefore, the questionnaire employed in this dissertation was
likely entirely hypothetical. Certainly, the ability of officers who have very limited
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experience with mental illness inside and outside of work to differentiate between serious
versus less-than-serious presentations of mental illness is also limited.
Use of Self-report Measures
In many instances, particularly when assessing potentially sensitive information,
self-report measures may impact the validity and reliability of information obtained
(Robinson & Clore, 2002). Notably, evidence of construct validity and reliability is
considerable for the PANAS (Crawford & Henry, 2004; Watson et al., 1988). In
addition, the anonymous assessment procedures used in the current study are likely to
have mitigated some of these concerns.
Sample/Population
Research that considers police perceptions of a suspect’s dangerousness or
resistance is difficult to conduct in the laboratory with college-student samples without
significant sacrifices to external validity. The use of any one sample raises obvious
questions about generalizability. This study is no different. Because this study was
conducted in a single city jurisdiction, with a specific sample of law enforcement
personnel, a determination of the degree to which the findings generalize to all law
enforcement is impossible.
Substantive Explanations for the Null Hypothesis
At least seven reasonable substantive explanations can be given for the study’s
failing to reject the null hypothesis. First, officers possibly do not interact with persons
who are mentally ill frequently enough to recognize the signs or symptoms of mental
illness. Second, officers may have difficulty imagining irrational resistance and, thus,
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may be less likely to see irrationality as a likely determinant of reasonable use of force.
Third, officers may not receive sufficient training on de-escalation techniques. Fourth,
officers rarely use deadly force and, thus, may be less able to distinguish when it should
be used. Fifth, officers may see all suspects who are escalating their resistance to force as
potentially irrational, whether that irrationality comes from mental illness, substance
abuse, or psychopathy. Sixth, given their relatively high rate of disciplinary charges, this
sample of police officers was less capable than others of following known procedures and
directives. Unfortunately, the research is scant on police disciplinary measures in local
and municipal police departments, thus making comparisons here is very difficult.
Finally, officer use-of-force decisions may, in part, be determined by their concern for
their own safety and the safety of others. The mental status of the suspect may be
significantly overshadowed by feelings of self-preservation and the desire for the safety
of others.
These explanations pose new questions, including whether officers who are
trained on linear models of the force continuum need specialized training in more
complex conceptualizations of resistance. Will additional training in gauging justifiable
use of force with suspects who are mentally ill result in better outcomes for both law
enforcement and the mentally ill? If so, would such training make law enforcement
select lower levels of force than would be justified to accommodate irrationality? Would
irrationality move law enforcement to use more force than necessary to accommodate
irrationality? Would additional police training allow officers to distinguish between and
among serious mental illnesses and other causes of irrationality, for example, drug
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intoxication? Would officer discrimination of illnesses result in better outcomes? Do the
results offer any insights into suggestions for existing crisis intervention team programs?
These questions, individually and collectively, require additional research. Answers to
these questions would have significant impact on use-of-force policies and even more
profound implications for the way in which suspects with mental illness are treated by the
criminal-justice system.
Relevance of the Study to the Theory and Practice of Psychology
Police are often first responders in situations that involve individuals who are
mentally ill. In such situations, a lack of clinical knowledge and related training may
combine in ways that result in injuries and the loss of life. The deinstitutionalization of
mental-health-care facilities, along with other factors, has put police in the position of
making custody versus treatment decisions for persons who are mentally ill—without
much training (Lamb & Bachrach, 2001). Predictions of violence are very difficult to
make, even for trained clinicians, and often result in false positives and negatives. For
armed law enforcement officers who are insufficiently trained, making such predictions is
fraught with errors that have potentially grave consequences.
The results of this dissertation suggest the value of developing the field of
professional police psychology and the importance of increasing the number of mentalhealth-care professionals on staff not only to treat officers with mental-health issues, but
also to further train and retrain officers to be better informed on mental-health issues.
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Possible Findings as Related to Future Work in the Area
The premise of this dissertation, that linear use-of-force guidelines may lead to
miscalculations with suspects experiencing mental illness, is concerning in several ways.
First, public and professional recognition of the plight of persons who are mentally ill and
untreated/unmedicated should be greater. The inability to find effective alternative
solutions to the deinstitutionalization of individuals who suffer from severe mental-health
disorders is part of the problem. The other part of the problem is that this new and
growing class of deinstitutionalized individuals with mental illness increasingly comes
into contact with law enforcement, putting generally unprepared and improperly trained
police officers in the position of assessing mentally ill individuals’ rationality and risk to
public safety and of bringing them into the criminal-justice system in a safe, helpful, and
professional manner, often with very little or no time for consultation or second thoughts.
Persons with mental illness often have few social or financial resources, may have
difficulty communicating, and are often inappropriate candidates for standard criminaljustice responses, including detention, adjudication, and incarceration. Rather, this
population may be good, appropriate candidates for medication and treatment in publicand mental-health facilities. Second, there should be more outrage that the criminaljustice system readily accepts large populations of individuals who are mentally ill into
jails and prisons, thereby punishing the “mad” as the “bad.” In addition to the potential
risk of mistreatment by the officers and other criminal-justice stakeholders, they may also
face the risk of harm and predation by inmates in the correctional facilities. Third, the
fact that this dissertation explores the “reasonableness” of using deadly force against
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populations of untreated/unmedicated suspects who are mentally ill should lead to
practical reforms from a greater collaboration between mental-health-care professionals
and criminal-justice officials.
Possible Implications Related to Diversity and/or Advocacy
Given a firm foundation of race-based differences, one should not be surprised
that use-of-force decisions with suspects who are mentally ill turn, at least in part, on (a)
race-determined calculations of the value of life, (b) race-based perceptions of
dangerousness, and (c) race-based perceptions of guilt and deservedness of punishment
(Adler et al., 2016). An exploration of the role of race in police use-of-force decision
making with suspects who are mentally ill is undoubtedly important. Innovations in
methods used to examine race-based effects in automobile stops and stop-and-frisk
practices should be employed in use-of-force research. Grogger and Ridgeway (2006)
and Ridgeway (2006), for example, found that allegations of race-based traffic stops were
generally unsupported by a natural experiment comparing daytime and nighttime stops in
Oakland, California, in spite of substantial anecdotal evidence to the contrary.
Nevertheless, future research on this topic should explore the role of suspect and
officer race, gender, age, and sexual orientation on officers’ use of force. As discussed
earlier, research on the relationship between suspect race and officer use of force is
already substantial. This work should also be extended to include officer demographics,
including, but not limited to, race, ethnicity, gender, and socioeconomic status.
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Conclusion
Police use-of-force decisions are important for the safety of communities and of
officers, and as a powerful symbol of the state’s authority to administer justice and ensure
order. When police decisions are made with suspects who are mentally ill, their
importance may be magnified. The law grants significant authority to police, as agents of
the state, to use force that is reasonable in light of suspects’ risk to others, the police, and
themselves. This discretion is bounded by a police officer’s experience, perceptions, and
knowledge of the law. Linear use-of-force continuums, regularly used in police
academies and as part of department policies, frame actual police decision making in
ways that are entirely rational. The more force used that is both reasonable and justified,
the less resistance is expected from a rational suspect. Thus, the movement from no force
(i.e., officer presence and verbal command) to moderate force (i.e., physical control holds
and OC sprays), less-than-lethal force (i.e., baton and electric control weapon), and then
deadly force is sequential and, at least on the margins, predictable. This coordinated
movement in both force and resistance movement, depicted in Appendix D, is reasonable
if within the linear force bounds of F1 and F2.
The challenge for first responders turns on the reasonableness of decision making
when resistance is neither sequential nor predictable. The hypotheses examined in this
dissertation assumed that officers would use force differentially, considering the
rationality of the suspect as an important determinant of force levels. However, the data
do not support a finding that this sample of police officers recognized the appearance of
mental illness as part of their decision-making calculus. As discussed, this failure of
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recognition may be an artifact or result of the methods or materials used. If it is not, a
number of possible interpretations were previously offered that could account for the
failure to reject the null hypothesis.
A practical problem that remains concerns the status quo of use-of-force practices
in police departments throughout the United States. With limited training in crisis
intervention, limited exposure strategies for de-escalating confrontations with persons
with mental illness, and increasing numbers of calls for service involving suspects and
complainants with mental illness, the default legal standard used to determine whether
force is justified is an objective reasonableness test, one that considers the totality of
circumstances.
In theory and in practice, deficits in police training and intervention strategies
significantly increase the range of force options F3 and F4, by setting the bar low with
respect to what may justifiably be expected of a reasonable police officer. The
reasonableness standard, quite perversely, grants wide discretion for police to stray from
the narrower band of F1 and F2. On occasions, this increased discretion in force options
will likely result in the use of more force than necessary, as some iconic and tragic cases
reveal. It may also result in other combinations of accommodation and compensation,
equally off the mark of reasonableness. That the mental-health community allows the
status quo to continue without cries for reform is, quite tragically, part of the greater
disregard of mental illness in the criminal-justice system. There are costs to this
disregard, in lives lost and lives changed forever.
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Appendix A

From D. Lind (2015), How do police departments train cops how to use force? Vox.com,
retrieved March 28, 2018, from https://www.vox.com/ 2014/9/5/6105373/police-allowedto-force-shoot-taser-training-policy
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Appendix B

From T.J. Aveni, (2003), Force continuum conundrum, Law and Order, 51(12), 74-77.

USE OF FORCE

78
Appendix C

From Ontario Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services (2016), retrieved
March 28, 2018, from http://www.mcscs.jus.gov.on.ca/english/PSIS/BasicTesting
/SecurityGuardStudyGuide/UseofForceTheory/SG_use_of_force.html
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From Chicago Police Department (2012), General Order G03-02-01, The use of force
model, retrieved March 28, 2018, from http://directives.chicagopolice.org
/directives/data/a7a57be2-128ff3f0-ae912-8fff-cec11383d806e05f. html

